Enterprise Computing Jumps on the Supply-Demand Curve

The traditional enterprise computing server suppliers are in an ever-faster game of musical chairs with cloud computing competitors. Recent cloud price cuts will accelerate enterprise adoption of the cloud, to the economic detriment of IBM, HP, Oracle Sun.

Many IT executives sat down to a cup of coffee this morning with the Wall Street Journal opened to the Marketplace lede, “Price War Erupts in Cloud Services.” Cloud computing from the likes of Amazon, Google, and Microsoft is “changing the math for corporate executives who spend roughly $140 billion a year to buy computers, Internet cables, software and other gear for corporate-technology nerve centers.” This graphic begs the question,

50 Million Page View Web Site Costs“Gee, maybe my data-center computing model for the company needs a strategic re-think?” And while there’s a very active consulting business by the usual business-transformation consulting suspects, the no-cost answer is: yes, cloud computing is a valid model that most enterprises and applications should move to over time.

This blog post, though, is not about the nuances of cloud computing today. Rather, we need to take a look at how the supply-demand curve for enterprise computing must impact the traditional enterprise server business — hard. (And yes, I am breaking a vow made during Economics 101 to never mention economics in polite company).

Cloud computing is sucking the profits out of the traditional server business.

For over fifty years, in the case of IBM, the traditional server companies including HP and Sun sold big iron, proprietary operating software and storage, and lots of services at high margins. In the past two decades, Intel’s mass-market silicon evolved into the Xeon family that took away a large percentage of that proprietary “big iron”. Yet the Intel specialist firms such as NCR and Sequent never could beat the Big Three server suppliers, who took on Xeon-based server lines of their own.

Cloud computing is sucking the profits out of the traditional server business. IBM is selling its Xeon business to Lenovo, and is likely to considerably reduce its hardware business. Oracle’s Sun business looks like a cash cow to this writer, with little innovation coming out of R&D. HP is in denial.

All the traditional server companies have cloud offerings, of course. But only IBM has jettisoned its own servers in favor of the bare-metal, do-it-yourself offerings from Amazon, Google, and lately Microsoft.

Price-war-driven lower cloud computing prices will only generate more demand for cloud computing. Google, and Microsoft have other businesses that are very profitable; these two can run their cloud offerings lean and mean. (Amazon makes up tiny margins with huge volume). To recall that Economics 101 chart:

Supply-Demand Curve

The strategic issue for IT executives (and traditional-supplier investors) is what happens over the next five years as lower server profits hollow out their traditional supplier’s ability to innovate and deliver affordable hardware and software? Expect less support and examine your application software stacks; you’ll want to make migration to a cloud implementation possible and economical. The book isn’t even written on cloud operations, backup, recovery, performance and other now well-understood issues in your existing data centers.

Meanwhile, what are your users up to? Like PCs sprouted without IT blessings a generation ago, cost-conscious (or IT schedule averse) users are likely playing with the cloud using your enterprise data. Secure? Regulatory requirements met? Lots to think about.

Follow me on Twitter @PeterSKastner

Microsoft: Wrong Strategy, Right Implementation

Last fall, then Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer announced the company’s new strategy as the “devices and services” company. I choked on this and remained silent because after all, Ballmer was on the way to retirement and the company was clearly on a road to change. I’m not a heckler.

However, let’s look at the strategy on the surface. First, Microsoft is not “the devices company”. They get credit for the xBox game consoles, mass-market mice and keyboards, and …. nothing more. The Microsoft-developed tablets and phones over the years have made hardly a dent in their respective markets. The assets and knowledge base of the Nokia acquisition aren’t likely to move the dial much either. My fellow analysts all agree on this state of reality.

Likewise, Microsoft’s overall impact on IT services is minuscule in the case of enterprise IT, and approximately non-existent in the case of consumers. You don’t need a focus group to determine that Microsoft is not top-of-mind for computer services. Therefore, I conclude the Microsoft as the “devices and services company” is a failure waiting to happen. The reality does not match the words.

Nevertheless, I applaud what Microsoft has been doing of late in making its familiar technology available on the real devices people own and use. A couple of weeks ago, the Office Suite became free apps for the Apple iPad. This morning, I loaded Word into Google Chrome on my Mac — and later I’ll put it on a Chromebook. In the devices space, Google (Android) and Apple (iPad and iPhone) are Microsoft’s arch enemies.

Enemies or not, I am paying nothing for the Microsoft apps on Chrome. I’m also paying nothing to store my documents on Microsoft’s OneDrive cloud storage. Free lunch on the Internet is good. Of course there’s a caveat, which is that my docs can only be stored in Microsoft’s OneDrive cloud. But that’s a free-market tradeoff that I and many consumers will be willing to make.

If Microsoft keeps implementing an “any device” strategy like the iPad/Chrome offer described above, they’ll do well and buff some tarnish off the brand. And if the company gets around to describing its strategy as “we are the best applications for everyday use by business and consumers on any device”, they might get more applause — and attention. Follow me on Twitter @PeterSKastner

Word for Chrome

“My ISP is a Solar-Powered Drone.”

Google, the ad-driven search giant, and Facebook, the social connections giant, are fighting over airplane drone technology companies. What’s that all about?

Solar-powered drones would, when they’re ready for mass-market in the next five years, be able to fly for weeks or months. They can take 2D and 3D photos resulting in better and more up-to-date maps. And they could serve as aerial Internet connections. It’s the latter that got my attention because it threatens the status quo in developed nations and opens new markets in developing nations.

Aerial Internet Drones (AIDs) suggest a breakout technology that solves — or at least remediates — the “wireless everywhere” mantra of the past decade. In developed countries such as the United States, intractable wireless problems include inadequate wireless bandwidth in high device areas (e.g., mid-town New York) necessitating more cell towers and greater slices of the electromagnetic spectrum. Moreover, “poor wireless coverage meets not-in-my-neighborhood” and inadequate capital make it politically and economically difficult to add enough cell towers to guarantee wireless broadband such as LTE to build a superior wireless broadband network in suburban and rural areas.

In underdeveloped geographies, which represent attractive new markets for the global technology and wireless companies, inexpensive and inadequate mobile broadband infrastructure creates a chicken-and-the-egg problem.

So, the vision to solve both developing and developed wireless broadband demand is to put up a global network of drones that serve as radio relays for wireless Internet connections. AIDs would be a new form of Internet router, loitering around a more-or-less fixed point in the sky.

At the right altitude, an AID has better line-of-sight than a cell tower located over the hill. The AID theoretically offers greater geographic coverage and often better signal quality than today’s cell tower networks. At a cost of less than $10 million per equipped AID, my envelope calculations suggest AID network costs compare favorably with cell towers for comparable geographic coverage.

In developing areas such as Africa, an AID network is a solution to creating metro- and rural-area Internet wireless infrastructure rapidly and without the difficulties of building land-line-connected cell towers.

Cellphone networks connect cell towers with land line connections to each other and to an Internet wired backhaul. An AID network needs to connect wirelessly to a) client cellphones and the Internet of Things and b) to a radio ground-station connected to an Internet wired backhaul. The radio ground-station is the crux of the difficulties I foresee.

The ground-station requires radio spectrum to communicate up to and down from the AID network. It represents a new demand on the over-burdened and highly political use of the electromagnetic spectrum. Where does the spectrum come from, whose ox is gored, and how are the skids greased?  Think lobbying.

Moreover, the incumbent cable and wireless ISPs (i.e., Comcast, Verizon, AT&T, Sprint, Dish, et al) are not likely to give up their near monopolies on Internet access by devices, homes, and businesses without a knockdown, drag-out political fight followed by years of litigation.

Add citizen privacy related to drone picture taking to this highly volatile Internet-industrial-complex wireless food fight and you can expect great spectator sport. Although in developing countries, the issue will be described as “drone spying by the NSA”.

Like many, I would greatly appreciate and even pay more for better wireless coverage and higher wireless device bandwidth. First, Google and Facebook have to solve the real technology problems of getting the AIDs into the sky. Second, they have to muscle a (much needed) rethink of wireless spectrum use and the roles of future ISPs through the political sausage factory, and nail down the new spectrum they need. Combined, this is a heavy lift.

So, with a sigh of regret, I suspect it will be quite a while before I can say “My ISP is a Solar-Powered Drone.”

Follow me on Twitter @PeterSKastner.

solar drone

Titan Aerospace/Associated Press

Google As “The Cross-Platform Apps Company”

A beta version of Google’s Chrome Browser now supports Chrome App Launcher. This opens up the Chrome Store apps to Windows, Linux, and Mac OS desktops plus Google Android and Apple iOS mobile phones and tablets. Not to mention Google’s Chrome OS. Cross-platform is good, users say, because they increasingly recognize the utility of apps and their data across the devices in their lives.

Google's Chrome App Launcher

Google’s Chrome App Launcher

Common apps running on a familiar user interface and operating system across a wide variety of hardware platforms is an idea that crops up frequently in the history of the computer industry. Unix and Windows NT come immediately to mind. Google is apparently bringing the cross-platform idea back into play.

The Chrome browser runs on Android, Windows, Linux, and Mac OS and has more recently appeared on iOS. Bookmarks, tabs, settings are synchronized in Google’s cloud including Drive storage, and available to any device at any time. Chrome apps add much more than typical browser extensions. They are real apps, albeit with cloud and local data. Docs, Sheets, and Slides are the functional equivalent of Word, Excel, and Powerpoint in the Microsoft universe, and Pages, Numbers, and Keynote in the Apple Universe.

Chrome apps plus the already cross-platform Chrome browser give Google a wider breadth of platforms than the competition. As more data and usage is moved to the cloud (e.g., Office365), the benefits will become more apparent to cloud-migration users.

Perhaps my personal journey is illustrative. Like many professional users, I’ve followed Microsoft’s Office apps for generations. But over the past decade — Vista comes to mind — I started using a Mac. And I still have PCs. However, I never invested heavily in the Apple iWork office suite, using it for mostly Microsoft-compatible import and export or, lately, to make cross-platform .pdfs of finished documents or presentations. I have expertise and a software investment in Microsoft PC office apps and have no foreseeable intention to move to Microsoft Office 365.

Since more of my consumption and production is happening on tablets and even smartphones, I’m a good candidate to drop Apple iWork and move to Google apps. These appear on the Mac desktop and launch just like Mac apps. Or Windows apps.

Moreover, the mobile apps I use from the Chrome Store are all there too: WorkFlowy, TweetDeck, QuickBooks, and Evernote. It’s not just cloud office.

Let’s leave aside the issue of whether your data is secure in the cloud. That applies to all apps everywhere, and is worth pondering another day.

Being able to run a familiar, common set of apps across all the major hardware and OS platforms and time is a valuable competitive advantage.

I don’t see the technology industry yet recognizing that Google is quietly setting up to be the only supplier that can run the same apps on any broadly used platform.

Follow me on Twitter @peterskastner. Your comments are invited.

POWER to the People: IBM is Too Little, Too Late

“On August 6, Google, IBM, Mellanox, NVIDIA and Tyan today announced plans to form the OpenPOWER Consortium – an open development alliance based on IBM’s POWER microprocessor architecture. The Consortium intends to build advanced server, networking, storage and GPU-acceleration technology aimed at delivering more choice, control and flexibility to developers of next-generation, hyperscale and cloud data centers.”

IBM Hardware Is Not Carrying Its Weight
As the last computer manufacturer with its own silicon fab, IBM has a financial dilemma. The cost of silicon fab investments is increasing. 
Hardware revenues are declining.  There are fewer new Z-series mainframes and POWER-based midrange computers on which to allocate hardware R&D, product development, fab capex, and other amortized costs. POWER revenues were down 25% in the latest quarter. Bloomberg reports furloughs of the hardware staff this month in an effort to cut costs.

The cloud-based future data center is full of Intel Xeon-based servers as practiced by Google, Amazon, Facebook et al. But margins on Intel-architecture servers — IBM’s instantiation is the X Series — are eroding. Widely believed rumors earlier this year had IBM selling off its X Series business to Lenovo, like IBM spun off its PC business in 2005.

Clearly, the IBM hardware business is the subject of much ongoing discussion in Armonk, NY.

The OpenPOWER Consortium is a Strategic Mistake
Our view view is that IBM has made a strategic mistake with this announcement by admitting proprietary defeat and opening POWER up to an open-source consortium. The signal IBM is sending is that it is no longer totally committed to the long-term future of its mainframe and POWER hardware. The sensitive ears of IBM’s global data center customers will pick this message up and, over time, accelerate plans to migrate off of IBM hardware and software.

Proprietary hardware and software business success depends a great deal on customer trust — more than is commonly assumed. Customers want a long term future planning horizon in order to continue investing in IBM, which is not the lowest-cost solution. When trust is broken, a hardware business can crash precipitously. One such example is Prime Computer, a 1980s Massachusetts darling that was acquired, dropped plans for future processors, and watched its installed base decline at a fifty-percent per annum rate. On the other hand, H-P keeps Digital Equipment and Tandem applications going to this day.

By throwing doubt on its future hardware business horizon, IBM risks its entire business model. Yes, that is a far-fetched statement but worth considering: the IBM services and software business is built around supporting, first and foremost, IBM hardware. Lose proprietary hardware customers, and services and high-margin software business will decline.

So, we think IBM is risking a lot by stirring up its customer base in return for a few million dollars in POWER consortium licensing revenue.

What About Google?
To see how this deal could turn even worse for IBM, let’s look at the motives of the headline consortium member, Google.

First, IBM just gave Google the “Amdahl coffee mug”. In the mainframe hay days of the 1970s, it was a common sales tactic for Amdahl, a mainframe clone company in fierce competition with IBM, to leave a coffee mug for the CIO. Properly placed on a desk, it sent the message to the IBM sales team to drop prices because there was competition for the order. A POWER mug — backed by open POWER servers — will send a pricing signal to Intel, which sells thousands of Xeon chips directly to Google. That action won’t budge the needle much today.

POWER servers are most likely to appear in Open Compute form, as blades in an open-hardware rack-tray. These are the cost-reduced server architectures we see sucking the margin out of the entire server industry. Gas on the fire of that trend.

And we don’t see Google needing to build its own Tier-3 backend database servers, a common role for POWER servers. However, Google customizing POWER chips with nVidia GPU technology for some distant product is believable. For example, we’re puzzling how Google will reduce the $85,000 technology cost of its driverless automobile to mass-market cost levels, and the consortium could become part of that solution.

Open POWER Software Too?
IBM is emphatically not throwing POWER operating system (i.e., AIX Unix and OS/400) and systems software into the open consortium. That would give away the IBM family jewels. So, the open-source hardware folks will quickly turn to the Linux on POWER OS’s. Given a choice, the buyers will turn to open-source — that is, free or lower cost — versions of IBM software equivalents for system software. We see little software-revenue upside to IBM’s POWER consortium move. Nor services either.

Fortunately, IBM did not suggest that POWER licensing would extend to the fast-growing mobile world of tablets and smartphones because that would be a bridge way too far. IBM may staunch some of the embedded POWER chip business lost to ARM’s customers and Intel in recent years through customizations by licensing designs ala ARM Holdings.

Thoughts and Observations
In conclusion, we see nothing good happening to IBM’s bottom line as a result of the OpenPOWER Consortium announcement. And if it wasn’t about the bottom line, why risk long-term customer trust in IBM’s long-term hardware platform commitments? The revenue from POWER licensing will not come close to compensating for the weakness that IBM displays with this consortium strategy.

I ask this without drama or bombast: can we now see the dim horizon where IBM is no longer a major player in the computer hardware business? That’s a huge question which until now has never been asked nor needed to be asked. Moreover, no IBM hardware products would mean no IBM fab is needed.

The real implications are about IBM’s declining semiconductor business. POWER (including embedded POWER) is a volume product for IBM Microelectronics, along with current-generation video game chips. The video game business dries up by year end as Sony and Microsoft introduce the next generation consoles, sans IBM content. POWER licensing through the OpenPOWER Consortium might generate some fab business for the East Fishkill, NY IBM fab, but that business could also go to Global Foundries (GloFo) or Taiwan Semi (TMSC). Where’s the chip volume going to come from?

IBM will not be able to keep profitably investing in cutting-edge semiconductor fabs if it does not have the fab volume needed to amortize costs. Simple economics of scale. But note that IBM fab technology has been of enormous help to GloFo and TSMC in getting to recent semiconductor technology nodes. Absent IBM’s help, this progress would be delayed.

Any move by IBM to cut expenses by slowing fab technology investments will have a cascading negative impact on global merchant semiconductor fab innovation, hurting, for example, the ARM chip ecosystem. Is the canary still singing in the IBM semiconductor fab?

Your comments and feedback are invited.

Follow @PeterSKastner on Twitter

IBM POWER Linux Server

IBM POWER Linux Server

Gaming AMD’s 2012 Strategy

AMD intends to pursue “growth opportunities” in low-powered devices, emerging markets and Internet-based businesses.

There’s an awful lot of mis-guided analysis wafting about regarding AMD’s new strategic direction, which the company says it will make public in February. This piece is to help you (and me) sort through the facts and the opportunities. I last took a look at AMD’s strategies earlier this year, available here.

Starting With the Facts

  • AMD is a fabless semiconductor company since 2009. The company depends on GlobalFoundries and soon Taiwan Semiconductor to actually fabricate its chips;
  • In its latest quarter, AMD had net income of about $100 million on $1.7 billion in revenue. Subsequently, the company announced a restructuring that seeks to cut costs by $118 million in 2012, largely through a reduction in force of about ten percent;
  • AMD has about a 20% market share in the PC market, which Intel says is growing north of 20% this year, largely in emerging markets;
  • AMD’s products compete most successfully against rival Intel in the low- to mid-range PC categories, but 2011 PC processors have underwhelmed reviewers, especially in performance as compared to comparable Intel products;
  • AMD has less than a 10% market share in the server market of about 250,000 units, which grew 7.6% last quarter according to Gartner Group;
  • AMD’s graphics division competes with nVidia in the discrete graphics chip business, which is growing in profitable commercial applications like high-performance supercomputing and declining in the core PC business as Intel’s integrated graphics is now “good enough” for mainstream buyers;
  • AMD has no significant expertise in phone and tablet chip design, especially the multi-function “systems on a chip (SOCs)” that make up all of today’s hot sellers.

What Will AMD CEO Rory Read’s Strategy Be?

I have no insider information and no crystal ball. But my eyebrows were seriously raised this morning in perplexity to see several headlines such as “AMD to give up competing with Intel on X86“, which led to “AMD struggling to reinvent itself” in the hometown Mercury News. I will stipulate that AMD is indeed struggling to reinvent itself, as the public process has taken most of 2011. The board of directors itself seems unclear on direction. That said, here is my score card on reinvention opportunities in descending order of attractiveness:

  1. Servers —  For not much more work than a desktop high-end Bulldozer microprocessor, AMD makes Opteron 6200 server processors. Hundreds or thousands more revenue dollars per chip at correspondingly higher margins. AMD has a tiny market share, but keeps a foot in the door at the major server OEMs. The company has been late and underdelivered to its OEMs recently. But the problem is execution, not computer science.
  2. Desktop and Notebook PCs — AMD is in this market and the volumes are huge. AMD needs volume to amortize its R&D and fab preparation costs for each generation of products. Twenty percent of a 400 million chip 2011 market is 80 million units! While faster, more competitive chips would help gain market share from Intel, AMD has to execute profitably in the PC space to survive. I see no role for AMD that does not include PCs — unless we are talking about a much smaller, specialized AMD.
  3. Graphics Processors (GPUs) — ATI products are neck-and-neck with nVidia in the discrete graphics card space. But nVidia has done a great job of late creating a high-performance computing market that consumes tens of thousands of commercial-grade (e.g., high price) graphics cards. Intel is about to jump into the HPC space with Knight’s Corner, a many-X86-core chip. Meanwhile, AMD needs the graphics talent onboard to drive innovation in its Fusion processors that marry a processor and graphics on one chip. So, I don’t see an AMD without a graphics component, but neither do I see huge profit pools either.
  4. Getting Out of the X86 Business — If you’re reading along and thinking you might short AMD stock, this is the reason not to: the only legally sanctioned software-compatible competition to X86 inventor Intel. If AMD decides to get out of making X86 chips, it better have a sound strategy in mind and the ability to execute. But be assured that the investment bankers and hedge funds would be flailing elbows to buy the piece of AMD that allows them to mint, er, process X86 chips. So, I describe this option as “sell off the family jewels”, and am not enthralled with the prospects for success in using those funds to generate $6.8 billion in profitable revenue or better to replace today’s X86 business.
  5. Entering the ARM Smartphone and Tablet Market— A sure path to Chapter 11. Remember, AMD no longer makes the chips it designs, so it lacks any fab margin to use elsewhere in the business. It starts against well-experienced ARM processor designers including Apple, Qualcomm, Samsung, and TI … and even nVidia. Most ARM licensees take an off-the-shelf design from ARM that is tweaked and married to input-output to create an SOC design, that then competes for space at one of the handful of global fab companies. AMD has absolutely no special sauce to win in the ARM SOC kitchen.To win, AMD would have to execute flawlessly in its maiden start (see execution problems above), gain credibility, nail down 100+ design wins for its second generation, and outrace the largest and most experienced companies in the digital consumer products arena. Oh, and don’t forget volume, profitability, and especially cash flow. It can’t be done. Or if it can be done, the risks are at heart-attack levels.

“AMD intends to pursue “growth opportunities” in low-powered devices, emerging markets and Internet-based businesses.” One way to read that ambiguous sentence by AMD is a strategy that includes:

  • Tablets and netbooks running X86 Windows 8;
  • Emerging geographic markets, chasing Intel for the next billion Internet users in places like Brazil, China, and even Africa. Here, AMD’s traditional value play resonates;
  • Internet-based businesses such as lots of profitable servers in the cloud. Tier 4 datacenters for Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google, and Microsoft are a small but off-the-charts growing market.

So, let’s get together in February and see how the strategy chips fall. Or post a comment on your game plan for AMD.

Google’s Android Comes to a Fork in the Road

Earlier this week, I wrote that Google was not treating its smartphone and tablet operating system, Android, with the software product support to ODM’s and customers needed to make Android a strong ecosystem-competitor to Apple’s iOS, iPhone and iPad. That puts the companies that rely on Android in their products between a rock and a hard place.

Getting Started
Today, let’s explore how the industry is likely to work around Google to get where it (thinks) it needs to go.

My going-in premise is that Google does not want to treat Android with the product-level support needed for a variety of reasons, including corporate culture, lack of any real product business focus, and lack of revenue from Android licenses to pay for the support. Thus, with Google not filling the product support vacuum, industry players will step in to defend their investments and markets.

The Smartphone Low End
First, the tablet market-stopping problems are in Android 3.0, code-name Honeycomb. The older 2.x versions for smartphones are stable enough. User problems are primarily with variations and customizations in Android that are not supported by generic Android apps from third parties like the Angry Birds game.

The low end is not going to rally around a common smartphone version of Android. In fact, the free, open source nature of Android makes it particularly attractive for small phone manufacturers who target local markets with low-cost products. Think $100 smartphones in China. With no OS software costs to speak of, product development costs are minimized — a critical economic point in short technology cycles like smartphones. To these ODMs, the idea is to create 90% of the experience with their embedded apps. If the customer downloads apps from the App Store that don’t work, caveat emptor.

My conclusion is that Google is losing the low end of the Android market and has no easy way to get it back. Humpty Dumpty Android fell off the great wall of China.

Google will continue to do some Android innovation on smartphones, especially with large firms like Samsung and HTC, and the software will trickle down to open source. But the low end will just take what’s on the “free software” shelf and productize it, warts and all.

The Tablet High-End
The scenario is simple. Google and its Honeycomb partners are in real trouble. The industry’s first Honeycomb tablet, the Motorola Xoom, is dead in the water with only a couple of dozen apps and plagued by software problems. Follow-on products by other manufacturers are widely reported as postponed. The tablet “anti-iPads” lack a viable competitor to Apple right now, this quarter. And Google is making no public pronouncements about “how it’s going to throw all the resources necessary to make this terrible situation right.”

The signs are that Google is looking for a white knight — or hostile takeover — to get the spotlight off these Android problems and out of Google’s active hands. Honeycomb has become a hot potato.

The White Knight is Intel
No one doubts that Intel has serious ambitions in smartphones later and tablets this year with its Atom processor. Intel’s OS horse was MeeGo, an OS partnership with Nokia. Now that Nokia is crumbling and has set its savior blessing on Microsoft’s Windows Mobile, MeeGo is a bet with very high odds right now. And Windows Mobile 8 is a 2012 solution to a 2011 problem.

“Intel is actively porting and optimizing Android for Atom”, according to CEO Paul Otellini at the company’s Q1 earnings conference call. Translation: “We are hedging our bets on MeeGo with a big bet on Android”.

“In software engineering, a project fork happens when developers take a legal copy of source code from one software package and start independent development on it, creating a distinct piece of software.” Wikipedia

My call is that the Android end-game results in a software fork of Honeycomb controlled by Intel. Intel, which already has an OS business unit, will not only make Honeycomb run on Atom, but will improve it. Moreover, Intel can support it as a business and charge ODMs appropriately. More costly than free-from-Google? Yes, but “free and not working” is worth nothing.

The tablet industry cost is that Intel is not going to do much more than hand the improvements to Honeycomb back to the open-source community. The ARM microprocessor tablet-ODMs get three Honeycomb choices: do it themselves; use Intel’s Atom-optimized stack; or continue depending on Google.

Intel is not jumping up and down about the responsibility for taking on Android (on top of MeeGo). But there is no other responsible industry home for Android with the resources and experience able to create the hardware, software, and ecosystem that’s needed to mount a serious competition to Apple’s iOS.